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Teaching Sensitivity To Facts
Abraham P. Ordove*
The last two decades have witnessed the widespread growth
of both clinical and simulation methods in legal education. To
some extent, the sophisticated use of these teaching methods has
met the criticism that law schools fail to prepare their students
for real world practice.1 Yet, the battle goes on. It is a battle be-
tween the practicing bar and the law teachers, and among law
professors as well. It began the moment law schools replaced the
clerking system of preparing fledgling lawyers.
At its most basic, the fight concerns the issue of whether the
schools inculcate a sensitivity to facts. This issue includes a host
of matters including fact gathering, the assimilation and marshal-
ling of facts, an understanding of the concept of relevance in
dealing with factual matters, and the difficult decisions lawyers
must make in trying to determine the probability of what oc-
curred.
Some argue that traditional case method instructors see value
only in teaching the mental manipulation of abstract concepts in
a context of known or fixed facts emanating from an appellate
opinion. Detractors assert that traditional methods teach students
to believe that principles of law are not fact sensitive.2 Of course,
without a context of facts there are no principles of law.' The
* LQ.C. Lamar Professor of Law and Director, litigation Program, Emory Universi-
ty. The author is indebted to Melissa Allen for her assistance in the researching of this
article.
1 Jerome Frank's criticism of the traditional law school curriculum is now well-
known. He stated as early as 1947 that "[t]he sole way for these law schools to get back
on the main track is unequivocally to repudiate Langdell's morbid repudiation of actual
legal practice, to bring the students into intimate contact with courts and lawyers."
Frank, A Plea For Lawyer Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1313 (1947). In 1953 Robert Marx
similarly stated: "Unfortunately the majority of our law schools have done little to give a
realistic education to the young lawyer in this all important field of getting the facts,
marshalling the evidence, and trying the case to a court or jury." Marx, Shall Law Schools
Establish A Course on "Facts"? 5 J. LEGAL EDUC. 524, 524 (1953).
2 Michael E. Tigar describes the "facts-in-the-past" of appellate opinions as "those
shadowy trial facts put through a judicial Cuisinart to adorn the judges' opinion." Tigar,
Discovering Your Litigator's Voice, 16 LITIGATION, Summer, 1990, at 1.
3 As noted by Professor Llewellyn: "We have learned that the concrete instance,
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principles grow from the variety of factual difficulties men and
women create.4 This we know as reality.5
How do we teach our corner of reality? First, we must know
what it is.
I. WHAT Do LAWYERS REALLY Do?
If you ask any handful of students the question, what do law-
yers really do, they would respond that they litigate or do corpo-
rate work, draft contracts and wills, advise on tax matters, and the
like. They would be fundamentally incorrect. In a remarkable sur-
vey, lawyers responded that what they do, day in and day out, is
investigate, gather, research, assimilate, and understand the rele-
vance of facts.6 This holds true for responses all across the lines
of expertise in the profession. And yet this fact work is, by and
large, not taught in our law schools.
The survey, The Making of a Public Profession,7 was published
in 1981 by Zemans and Rosenblum for the American Bar Founda-
tion. They surveyed more than 500 Chicago-area lawyers drawn
from throughout the profession. The results demonstrated that
only two matters were considered essential "skills." Some 93% of
the respondents reported that "fact gathering" was the most im-
portant skill of the practicing lawyer.8 The second most impor-
tant real work skill for the lawyer was the "capacity to marshall
facts and order them so that concepts can be applied."' Some
91% of the lawyers voted that this attribute was important or ex-
tremely important.
the heaping up of concrete instances, the present, vital memory of multitude of concrete
instances, is necessary in order to make any general proposition, be it rule of law or
any other, mean anything at all." K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND
ITS STUDY 12 (1960) (emphasis in original).
4 Judge Samuel S. Leibowitz, a leading criminal lawyer in New York as well as
member of the criminal court bench, once advised: "Remember that a trial ... is more
of a fact suit than a law suit." Quoted in-Q. REYNOLDS, COURTROOM: THE STORY OF
SAMUEL S. LEIBOWrrz 409 (1950).
5 Indeed, Roget's defines "facts" and "reality" as synonymous. ROGET'S II: THE
NEW THESAURUS 15 (both words are synonyms for "actuality"), 802 (defining "reality" as
the "quality of being factual") (1988).
6 Justice Cardozo wrote: "Lawsuits are rare and catastrophic experiences for the
vast majority of men, and even when the catastrophe ensues, the controversy relates
most often not to the law, but to the facts." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 128-29 (1921).
7 F. ZEMANs & V. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1981).
8 Id. at 124-25 (particularly Table 6.1.).
9 Id.
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The lawyers said that they had not learned the art of fact
gathering in law school but had to learn it from experience.
10
Most agreed, however, that the law schools could teach these
most necessary matters.
To be sure, we endeavor to make students sensitive to the
facts by teaching them to draw distinctions among cases and doc-
trines. The result, some contend, is that students have at least an
appreciation for facts in the context of using them in briefs and
memoranda to support legal contentions. This is likely true but
teaches sensitivity to facts from only one end of the spectrum. If
all lawyers ever confronted were facts that the parties agreed .up-
on, no further inquiry would be warranted. Agreed statements of
fact, however, are not the norm in our industry. Indeed, lawyers
in argument before the United States Supreme Court and the
host of lower appellate courts find that it is urgent to argue the
facts, despite the proceedings below. Justice Jackson contended
that the purpose of the hearing is so "that the court may
learn . .. facts. It may sound paradoxical but most contentions of
law are won or lost on the facts."11 As Judge Crane once said,
"We want the facts-the hardest thing in the world to get."'
2
What students are not generally taught is sensitivity to the
finding and gathering of information in the context which we
define as the fact-finding process. Students know nothing about
finding facts in the "real world sense." At the outset of the con-
flict, little is known about the complex of data, recollection, and
human emotions that are referred to as facts during trial.
During our attempts in the courtroom to reconstruct an
event or series of them that occurred outside, we have what Pro-
fessor Tigar calls the imprint of traces. of facts.'" If we look at
10 Id. at 134-35 (particularly Table 6.4).
11 Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations,
37 A.B.A. J. 801, 803 (1951), quoted in Marx, supra note 1, at 526.
12 Crane, Introduction to the Fint Edition, in S. ScHwErrzER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR NEG-
LIGENCE ACnTONS xii (2d ed. 1941).
13 Tigar described "facts" as things never seen in litigation. Instead, Tigar stated
that "[w]e see instead their remnants, tracts, evidence, fossils-their shadows on the court-
house wall. The witnesses recount . . . more or less. Things-paper, hair, bones, pictures,
bullets-parade by, each attached to a testifier who alone can give them meaning." Tigar,
Habeas Corpus and the Penalty of Death (Book Review), 90 COLUM. L REV. 255, 256
(1990) (reviewing J. LUEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(1988)). See also Tigar, supra note 2. The complex impressions which go together to
make the "facts" of a case do not stop with the witnesses' recollection, however. The
judge and jury base their acceptance of each side's "facts" not only on the verbal ac-
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the eyewitness' description of an event, we have his recollec-
tion-opinion of what he saw. There was a fact. Defendant did
drive through the school zone at a speed of fifty miles per hour.
Witness Two is certain that she saw him moving at a speed of
about thirty miles per hour. Both witnesses testify at the trial.
What is the fact? It is that blend of recollection, impression and
opinion that a jury distills for a finding of fact based upon its
estimate of the probability of what occurred. 4
Where do we teach the probability of what occurred; the
sifting of impressions, recorded data and the like? 5 This is not a
manipulation of facts but rather the attempt to find the probabili-
ty.l6 The use of data in argument (advocacy) involves an order-
ing of evidence to induce belief in a particular probability. Client
representation in an adversary system requires this ordering pro-
cess. The ordering is tested by the contrary ordering of the op-
ponent. Each party selectively uses its understanding of the facts
to create its theory of the case-that amalgam of fact, law, and
counts given by witnesses but on a collection of intangible impressions. Judge Frank
describes the process well:
[W]hen the testimony [in a case] is in conflict . . . the "facts" of a lawsuit con-
sist of the judge's belief as to what those facts are. That belief results from the
impact on the judge of the words, gestures, postures, and grimaces of the wit-
nesses. His reaction-inherently and inescapably subjective-is a composite of the
way in which his personal predilections and prejudices are stimulated by the
sights and sounds emanating from the witnesses.
Frank, supra note 1, at 1308 (quoting Frank, A Sketch of an Influence, in INTERPRETATIONS
OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOsOPHIES 189, 235 (1947) (footnote omitted)).
14 Judge Frank goes so far as to describe "facts" as "what trial judges or juries
guess-what they think the facts are." Frank, supra note 1, at 1308.
15 Judge Weinstein asserted that we do this in law school with classes in evidence.
He said that "findings of fact and the way they may be shaped, is discussed in enough
detail in both the advanced procedure and the evidence courses so that the student
should know what he can do and what he cannot do and the advantages of adroit han-
dling of these findings." Weinstein, The Teaching of Fact Skills in Courses Presently in the
Curriculum, 7 J. LEGAL EDUc. 463, 469 (1955). Empirical data found by Zemans and
Rosenblum indicates that Judge Weinstein's view may not be shared by practicing law-
yers. See F. ZEMANs & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 7, at 135-39 and Table 6.5. Moreover,
most evidence classes are based on appellate opinions or canned facts in "problems."
16 Judge Frank described the lawyer's role in advising a client as one of 'attempting
to predict, to guess, what decision will be rendered in a specific bit of litigation." Frank,
supra note 1, at 1310. Professor Hegland is preoccupied with his concept of the "manip-
ulation" of facts. He stated: "The exercise [of simulated litigation] becomes a game in
which the role of the lawyer is to manipulate the few given facts into any pattern or
theory which will prevail." Hegland, Moral Dilemmas in Teaching Trial Advocacy, 32 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 69, 72 (1982). To reach that conclusion, he indulges a variety of assump-
tions, none of which is compelled if the instructor's sense of ethics is of a higher order
than Professor Hegland's assumptions.
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inference which is the strongest argument that can be mustered
on behalf of the client."
Our teaching is largely based on untested assumptions of
facts in appellate opinions plus hypotheticals. In a real sense, we
teach students to think of facts backwards. We must teach the
process of investigation, assimilation and classification of factual
data together with logic (relevance) which inculcates an apprecia-
tion for the relationships among the data found. Students know
how to read the record if someone has created it for them. Now
they need to be taught how to make it.
Professor Amsterdam has said:
When I was in law school, I spent virtually all of my time
learning analytic techniques for predicting or arguing what was
the legal result, or what should be the legal result, in a given
fact situation. Since I get out of law school, I have spent virtu-
ally all of my time dealing with situations in which the facts
were not given, in which there were options as to what fact
situation should be created-situations in which I had a choice
whether to present evidence on certain aspects of the facts in
a litigation or to leave the record silent on those as-
pects .... 18
II. THE TEACHING OF FACT SENSITvrIY
The problem with traditional law school approaches is seen
on the first day. Every law school has some sort of course in writ-
ing and research. In most of these first-semester programs the
students, after rudimentary instruction, are asked to write a
dosed-end memorandum. This document is based upon cases and
a slim set of facts, virtually all of which are given. The entire
universe of options is provided in both law and fact. Later, the
course moves to memoranda of law of the open-ended variety.
That is, the students have to find the applicable cases and statuto-
ry material to support the argument they will make. The facts,
17 Neither the selection process nor the argument requires an unethical manipula-
tion of the data or law.
18 Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Centuy Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
612, 614 (1984) (emphasis in original). -Professor Amsterdam listed three kinds of rea-
soning which, he believes, should be taught in law school, although at present are not:
1) ends-means thinking; 2) hypothesis formulation and testing in information acquisition;
and 3) decision making in situations where options involve differing and often uncertain
degrees of risks and promises of different sorts. Id. at 614-15.
1991)
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however, remain as given. In this universe of canned facts, the
student is never faced with making decisions (options) as to what
the relevant facts are which support the contentions he or she
will make. 9 The same attitude toward facts is endemic in the
larger law school curriculum.
Suppose that in addition to the standard research course, the
law schools also required a basic course in "facts."20 That course
would have no closed-end memo. From the outset, the student
would be required to sort out a complex of factual data from a
variety of sources and, through the application of concepts of
relevance, submit a narrative of selected facts, the purpose of
which would be to persuade the reader as to the probability of
what occurred. The selection process itself would be the subject
of intense critique. It is here in the selection process that students
may manifest a lack of logic or a tendency to "create" facts or
manipulate them beyond ethical or common sense limits. Catch-
ing these problems at the very outset of the law school experi-
ence will do a great deal to instill an understanding of the limits
of proper advocacy.
This course would be only the first experience with finding
the "facts" where they are not given. It could be accomplished
with the use of actual clinical cases, as some schools have done,
or through simulation. In the simulation model, several complex
19 Professor Steven Lubet stated: "The lesson that we teach with canned materials is
one of stasis, and except within the narrowest confines of persuasion it must be entirely
wrong." Lubet, What We Should Teach (But Don't) When We Teach Trial Advocacy, 37 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 123, 137 (1987). This is a long-standing criticism of law schools. See NEW
JERSEY SUPREME COURT'S COMM. ON TRAINING FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW, REPORT OF
THE N.J. SUPREME COURT'S COMMITTEE ON TRAINING FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1957).
While finding that the average law school graduate had "developed the quality of fact
sensitivity to a fairly high degree," id. at 6, the report conceded that most factual prob-
lems presented in law school have been "predigested." I&L at 7. The study concluded
that, if possible, greater training with regard to "digging out" and "dealing with facts
which are not known in advance to exist" would be of great help to students. Id. at 8.
20 Professor Marx stated that, based on his 43 years of experience in trial work, he
agreed "emphatically" as to "the necessity for adding a course on 'Facts' to the curricu-
lum of our law schools. By a course of Facts, I do not mean a course on evi-
dence .... A course on acts deals with the truth regardless of the rules on evidence."
Marx, supra note 1, at 526. Professor William Twining, slightly tongue-in-check, has gone
so far as to suggest the creation of a "B.F." degree, "Bachelor of Facts." Twining, Tak-
ing Facts Seriously, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22, 23 (1984). In support of introducing such a
class at the first-year level, William Van Valkenburg noted: "Any change in curriculum or
methodology that is intended to have real impact must be directed to the first year
curriculum." Van Valkenburg, Law Teacher Law Students, and Litigation, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 584, 609 (1984). See also Tomain & Solimine, Skills Skepticism in the Post Clinic
World, 40 J. LEGAL EDuc. 307, 310 (1990).
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fact situations could be created. Students would be given nothing
but a client. From the client interview, the student would grope
his or her way along to learning who the other witnesses might
be. Gradually, the students would uncover the existence of a wide
variety of documents. These would have to be found, read, dis-
tilled and understood. They may consist of witness' prior state-
ments, official records, diaries, newspapers, and so forth. The
material will contain inconsistent reports of details and some in-
correct data. Motives to falsify data may be found. The student
would have to decide not only which facts are relevant but also
which renditions are circumstantially probable or improbable.
After sifting all of the material, perhaps learning the rudi-
ments of client interview techniques and discovery, "counsel"
would have to write a comprehensive memorandum of fact and,
yes, of law, to the senior partner. This document would organize
all materials uncovered into a theory of the case from which fur-
ther proceedings might go forward. In the usual law school cours-
es, the theory of the case is either not taught at all or is empha-
sized only from a legal standpoint. The aim of this course is to
create the theory of the case from the development of the facts,
the law and the decisions made by counsel as to how to use that
amalgam of information.
Courses of this sort are always labor intensive. Since several
fact complexes would be created, the student in the first simula-
tion becomes a client or witness in the second simulation. The
faculty members serve as senior partners and as administrators to
keep things moving. Since the- aim of the course is to teach sensi-
tivity to fact gathering as a process of decision making, the real
intricacies of client interviewing and formal discovery are better
left to courses or portions of courses specifically devoted to those
subjects.
This course, or one like it, should be required in the early
weeks of every law school curriculum. It can be combined with
the existing research program or be offered separately. The use
of simulation for this course permits the faculty to control the
complex of facts and the legal issues which will flow. This course
can form the basis of all the advocacy courses offered later in the
curriculum.
III. THE ADVOCACY CURRICULUM
The emphasis of the entire advocacy curriculum should be on
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fact sensitivity and complexity, both legal and factual. For years,
some law professors have considered the "skills" courses as the
intellectual doormat of the curriculum. The word "skills" leaves
their tongues as a word of derision. To the extent that advocacy
courses are offered as little more than exercises in where to stand
or how to do it courses with little intellectual content, we have
earned that derision. However, things changed in this area of law
teaching a long time ago.21 Courses in Pretrial and Advanced
Litigation, for example, can be taught with such a high degree of
complexity as to be among the most difficult in the curriculum.
If necessary, we must make changes in every existing advoca-
cy course as well as add new ones. Starting early in the curricu-
lum, the first-year moot court exercise found in most schools
should be made a more rigorous experience. It is relatively simple
to add a degree of difficulty to the legal problems. More impor-
tant we must do away with the canned facts. Once again, as in
the research course, the students become comfortable with the
erroneous idea that the plaintiff and defendant (or petitioner and
respondent, or appellant and appellee) see the facts the same way.
Under these circumstances, the statement of facts in the brief is
an unworthy exercise. Students cannot learn how to weave the
facts throughout the legal arguments in the brief and oral argu-
ment unless they view the facts as the building blocks of their
case. Moot court teaches precisely the opposite message. It is a
dangerously wrongheaded message. Authors of moot court prob-
lems will have to become more adept at creating problems with a
variety of debatable facts for each side to analyze and use.
The same kind of difficulty can be seen in many basic trial
advocacy courses. The quality of the trial record makes all the
difference in what will be taught to the students.22 Some of the
problems in use today, perhaps most of them, raise too few factu-
al issues. Often, one reads an entire trial file to find only one dis-
agreement of fact in the file. Small wonder that students begin to
21 See generally Ordover, An Experiment in Classroom Litigation, 26 J. LEGAL EDUc. 98
(1973).
22 The importance of a real-life trial record has been emphasized by members of all
segments of the legal community. Judge Patricia Wald, Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has stated: "I think it is down-
right wrong for a student to graduate from law school without knowing how to make a
record . . . . Unfortunate precedent is often the by-product of an appeal on a deficient
record." Wald, Teaching the Trade: An Appellate Judge's View of Practice-Oriented Legal Edu-
cation, 36 J. LEGAL EDuc. 35, 39-40, 40-41 (1986).
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accept the absurd notion that all the witnesses are telling the
truth. No healthy skepticism is engendered. The only attention
that they pay to impeachment is the gross area of prior convic-
tions. Occasionally, impeachment with a prior inconsistent state-
ment will be seen, usually where the witness flubs his lines.
Obviously, this is curable with attention to the objectives to
be achieved in the course. Whether the course is NITA-style or
one that runs through a semester, the crafting of the case files
into materials with manifold factual and impeachment problems
built in will result in a more interesting and more intellectually
challenging course. The goals of forcing students to make deci-
sions on what evidence they will rely and what precisely will be
the theory of the case can be achieved. The additional goals of
inculcating a strong sense of client representation (i.e., that we are
a service profession) and developing an ethical dedication in the
students can better be achieved where students must make diffi-
cult decisions themselves, as part of their course training as op-
posed to a course where the materials make all the decisions for
them.
23
IV. BEYOND THE BASIC COURSES
Just what mix of courses is best for any school is the proper
decision of its faculty. It is not the purpose of this paper to dis-
cuss all the varieties of clinics, clinical law office and clinical
placements which schools offer. In all of these there are doubtless
the twin goals of education and public service, both of which are
praiseworthy. The question for l advocacy teachers in all envi-
ronments is whether the clinics or simulation programs effectively
impart the goals of sensitivity to facts, the fact-gathering process,
and the ability to extract relevant facts to support the legal theory
counsel has chosen.
23 The importance of allowing students to learn to make decisions is stressed by
many scholars. Judge Frank has stated: "The work of the lawyer revolves about specific
decisions in definite pieces of litigation." Frank, Why Not A Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U.
PA. L. REv. 907, 910 (1933). Judge Wald asserted: "The greatest lawyer trait of
all-judgment, the art of the possible--can best be learned by confronting the infinite
frustrations and dilemmas that come from having to make decisions, not just reviewing
the decisions of others." Wald, supra note 22, at 4243. Professor LaFrance deems the
entire "lawyering process" as "essentially a process of choices, an orientation that will
not change by the year 2010. Choice is of the essence in common-law development and
in constitutional assurance of liberty." LaFrance, Clinical Education and the Year 2010, 37
J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 363 (1987).
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Pretrial Litigation is one example of a successful simulation
course.24 This course, at least when properly taught, has no
canned problem to be given to the students. Instead, the student
is given a client and told to go to work. There is formal instruc-
tion in client interviewing, pleadings, motion practice, discovery,
accelerated relief, brief writing, and oral advocacy. These are sepa-
rated from the portion of the course where the students simply
start with the client and work as lawyers work. Under the supervi-
sion of a senior partner (instructor), the student makes all deci-
sions, drafts and serves all papers, takes all depositions, and ar-
gues all motions. The instructor rigorously critiques the student
on every aspect of his work. The legal issues are difficult and
usually beyond the coverage of any particular course. Thus, the
student also has to teach himself new aspects of substance and
procedure to endure. The learning that necessarily goes on is
extraordinary.
The Advanced Litigation course is one that should build up-
on the Pretrial course. Instead of ending with a hearing on an
injunction, or other accelerated relief, the course builds though a
maze of factual complexity in discovery to a rule 16 order and
conference, and ultimately to trial.
As in all advocacy courses, these advanced courses depend
upon the quality of the problems and the instruction. These two
classes are not the only possibilities for simulation. Other simula-
tions which are and will increasingly be found in the curriculum
include Negotiations, Alternate Dispute Resolution, a trial ethics
simulation, Intermediate and Advanced Criminal Litigation, a
damages simulation, Medical Malpractice, and workshops in spe-
cialized areas.
If the emphasis is to shift to lawyering, however, some reor-
ganization of the third-year might be in order. Now, many stu-
dents view the third year of law school as a waste of time. It is
not unless the student has decided to sitting in large, essentially
24 Professor Edward Cavanagh cites the development of "fact-gather skills" as one of
the advantages to students being taught pretrial discovery in law school. He stated: "In
isolation, data may appear meaningless, but when they are properly integrated, the facts
tell a compelling story." Cavanagh, Pretrial Discovery in the Law School Curriculum: An
Analysis and a Suggested Approach, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 401, 404 (1988). Professor Edward
Imwinkelried praises litigation courses in general for their ability to develop students'
professional judgment. See Imwinkelried, The Development of Professional Judgment in Law
School Litigation Courses: The Concepts of Trial Theory and Theme, 39 VAND. L. REv. 59
(1986).
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repetitive, and boring classes.,.The alternative of a clinical or simu-
lation experience is obvious.25 The whole third year of law
school would be viewed differently if a required lawyering simu-
lation was added to the required writing seminar found in most
schools. Simulations in every aspect of practice can be offered
from Securities Regulation to Taxation. The key to an effective
third-year experience is to persuade our colleagues to create new
materials in their own disciplines which will provide a capstone of
lawyering experience to their substantive course area. Thus, stu-
dents of criminal law not enrolled in a major clinical experience,
or in addition to it, would take a simulation in Advanced Crimi-
nal Litigation. The course could proceed from the intake inter-
view, much like the Pretrial model. It would likely involve nasty
search and seizure or confession issues along with evidentiary
problems of some size. The subject matter might involve RICO
and forfeiture matters, and a variety of dilemmas.
Any area of the law can be used. A simulation course in real
estate sales can proceed from the planning aspects through the
zoning board difficulties to the host of negotiating and drafting
problems associated with a real estate transaction.
These courses do exist. They can be found in bits and pieces
at one law school or another. Unfortunately, they are not coordi-
nated. This lack of coordination arises because we have not yet
recognized the fundamental change in legal education which these
courses will bring. The endless prattling debates over the case
method26 will disappear when law teachers see the remarkable
progress that their students can achieve in a difficult and complex
simulation. The focus of legal education will gradually shift from
producing a few capable clerks to producing an avalanche of ca-
pable, thinking lawyers. They will be every bit as well educated as
past generations of law students; indeed, they will be better edu-
cated. Moreover, they will be excited and interested in what they
are doing in law school.
25 Judge Frank was aware of this problem long 'ago: "[I]n the law schools, much of
three years is squandered, by bored students, in applying that technique [of analyzing
upper-court decisions] over and over again-and never with reference to a live client or a
real law suit ... ." Frank, supra note 1, at 1318.
26 The case method will remain an invaluable tool for law teachers. The absurd
idea that it is the only effective teaching tool is the notion that must be dispelled.
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